



“LEBANON – THE HOST NATION THAT HAS BECOME THE HOSTAGE”

INTRODUCTION

1. The World Lebanese Cultural Union (**WLCU**) welcomes the opportunity to speak on behalf of the Diaspora on the plight of Lebanon and the dilemma that she finds herself in, in hosting and giving refuge to 1,055,984 displaced Syrians, who are registered with the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (**UNHCR**) as at 26 February 2016.
2. This Paper will address, with the degree of sensitivity and emphasis as necessary, not only the plight of the refugees and/or displaced persons, but equally will highlight, as is implicit, the plight of the domestic Lebanese populace and the menacing manifestation that the enforced requirement for Lebanon to uphold its international law obligations with respect to the refugee and displaced persons populace has inevitably taken its toll and will increase in the toll taken on the Lebanese population, unless urgent action is implemented by the United Nations and the International Global Community. In short, Lebanon the host has become the hostage.

PREAMBLE

3. It is the UN Summit for Refugees and Migrants that presents this most auspicious occasion and an optimum opportunity to undertake the privilege of attending and enabling our perspective as the NGO affiliated with the United Nations, affording our organisation an opportunity to speak to this very real and pressing problem that has beset our countrymen and has affected the Lebanese Diaspora.
4. In the anticipation of the Summit, Honourable His Excellency Ban Ki-moon, the Secretary General (hereafter **SG**) has published a Report titled **“In Safety and**

Dignity: Addressing large movements of refugees and Migrants”, which is a Follow-up to the Outcome of the Millennium Summit Ref: **A/70/59 21.4.16**.

5. The thrust of the Report (hereafter to refer to the Secretary General’s Report more particularly identified above) is succinctly summarised at page 1 of the Report.
6. Nevertheless, we would do well in setting the template for this Paper to highlight from that Summary the key passage that we see as indicative of the parameters under which the Summit will no doubt debate and agitate the issues that globally beset the world and in particular regionally, within the Middle East and of special significance to the WLCU, in Lebanon.
7. The learned Secretary General made the following statement by way of summation of his Report as follows:

“Following a short review of related recent initiatives, there is a call for new global commitments to address large movements of refugees and migrants, commencing with recommendations to ensure at all times the human rights, safety and dignity of refugees and migrants, including on addressing the causes of such movements, protecting those who are compelled to undertake such journeys, and preventing the discrimination and countering the xenophobia they frequently encounter. A more predictable and equitable way of responding to large movements of refugees is called for through the adoption of a global compact on responsibility sharing for refugees, and the elements of a comprehensive response plan for refugees are set out. Lastly, a call is made in the Report for strengthening the global governance of migration through the development of a global compact for safe, regular and orderly migration in a process to be initiated now and realised in the coming years.”

8. Presciently put, as is the custom of the learned Secretary General, there is no doubt that the issues so highlighted are ably posited, but they lack one critical integer, which is: *What measures are required, both by way of remedial and ameliorative steps where host nations have inevitably impacted upon their societies and economies, consequences that they can neither tolerate nor more importantly factor within their current regimes of economic development, such that they are inevitably impaired and irreparably, in some cases?*

9. This failure, with respect to factor into and recognise the reciprocity of host nations having adverse impacts, is a matter that is equally necessitous for the UN and its constituent members and we trust that the Summit will not only turn its attention to those matters but resolve a regime for restoring host nations who have suffered adverse impact.
10. Critically, Lebanon is such a nation but more importantly a worthy recipient of the remedial and the rehabilitative response that we respectfully suggest is both wanting and long-overdue, concerning Lebanon's laudable program of hosting and assisting refugees and displaced persons who, incidentally, do not feature in the Secretary General's Report as a specific category.
11. This is somewhat unusual but nevertheless a feature that we have seen fit to highlight, as it denies the nomenclature of all of the various types of people in need of protection in Lebanon, namely refugees and displaced persons and on occasions internal displaced persons (**IDPs**).
12. In respect of the latter category, the UN Secretary General's IDP Representative, in his publication "The guiding principles on internal displacement of person" (OHCHR, 1998) defines IDPs as:

"... persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of, in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalised violence, violation of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an international or state border".
13. Such a definition reveals a subtle difference between refugees and IDPs, the main distinction being the crossing of territorial borders by refugees and IDPs' confinement to the same territory.
14. However, the boundary issue has come under serious attack, given that the two types of forced migrants bear the same characteristics, including self-residence and living in

camps. The Refugee Policy Group (1992) gave a broader enumeration of causes of internal displacement to include civil war, breakdown in civil order, ethnic tension, forced resettlement, demobilisation and refugee repatriation.

15. To this category we would add displaced persons, who are as a result of armed conflict and classically within theatres of war such as Iraq and Syria, see the flight of those persons so displaced into nations offering or being sought as centres of refuge such as Lebanon. In that regard we need to categorise between what are genuine or for that matter conventional refugees in accordance with the Convention, which we shall discuss in due course, and displaced persons.

16. Before we undertake such a consideration it is appropriate at this stage to refer to information provided by the Beirut representative of the UNHCR as recently as July 2016 which gave an overview of what the present status and make-up was of the refugee and displaced person populace within Lebanon.

17. According to UNHCR statistics the country of origin for refugees and displaced persons within Lebanon and in respect of non-Palestinian refugees was in the order of 1,033,513 registered as refugees from Syria and 21,000 registered refugees from other nations and in particular Iraq.

18. The distribution of the displaced person populace was as follows:

• Beirut/Mt Lebanon	292,885
• North Lebanon	252,450
• Bekaa	363,417
• South Lebanon	118,761

19. It was also estimated that there have been some 80,000 births to Syrian refugees parents in Lebanon since 2011.

20. As at July 2016 the UNHCR had not registered any newly arrived refugees since the proclamation of the Lebanese Government's policy in the beginning of 2015 which established a new entry regulatory regime whereby refugees were only admitted into Lebanon for exceptional humanitarian reasons.
21. On enquiring as to the percentage of families receiving monthly welfare and the quantum of that welfare, information was provided as follows:
- There are currently 43,000 Syrian refugee households, equating to 260,000 individuals who benefit from monthly cash assistance of US\$175 per household, provided by UNHCR and a number of other organisations. This represented a small proportion of the overall case load.
 - Currently, there are approximately 700,000 Syrian refugees benefiting from monthly food allowances of US\$27 per month provided by the World Food Program.
 - Food and multipurpose assistance are given to the most vulnerable refugees and in consideration of that assistance factors taken into account highlight that 70% of the registered refugees live below the poverty line, which equates to US\$4 per day and 50% of that population are below the extreme poverty line, which equates to US\$2.80 per day.
 - In spite of the assistance and services provided by national and international agencies, the living conditions of refugees across Lebanon have sharply declined since the beginning of the Syrian crisis, i.e. 2011. The existing safety net is vital to ensure that refugees stay afloat until their return becomes possible.
22. Understandably, discussion then centred on a plan for permanent settlement in Lebanon and in particular whether the rumour that there was going to be erected portable housing in the Bekaa Valley was responded to by a denial of any discussion of permanent settlement of Syrian refugees or refugees of any other nationality in

Lebanon. It was further stated that local integration of refugees is a sovereign decision and that only States can make that decision. It was noted that the Government of Lebanon has made it clear that local integration is not an option. It was further expressed that the UN position was not to pursue local integration as a solution for Syrian refugees in Lebanon. The preferred solution was for those refugees to return in safety and dignity to their homeland as and when they can. The UN will support their return and reintegration into Syria once conditions are favourable and in accordance with the principle of *non-refoulement* to which the Government of Lebanon is fully committed. In the interim, the UNHCR will continue to work on resettling the most vulnerable refugees outside Lebanon and to consider other opportunities for Syrian refugees to be located to third host nations.

IMPACT

23. It is critically a feature of this Paper that the need to highlight Lebanon and its role in the treatment of displaced persons and refugees must be seen from the perspective of the impact that this has had on Lebanon.
24. The refugee presence in hosting countries has a potential for social impacts on the ethnic balance of those host nations and social conflict generated thereby, together with the delivery of social services.
25. The socio-cultural impact of refugees on the host community may occur simply because of their presence. Thus, if the traditional animosities exist between cultural or ethnic groups, it may cause problems when one group becomes exposed to another that has been forced to become a refugee or a displaced person.
26. A recent example of this, outside of Lebanon was in the late 1990s where the mere presence of Kosovo-Albanian refugees in Macedonia generated tensions between ethnic Albanians and Serbs in Macedonia: see Pini, 2008: "Political violence and the African refugee experience", *International Affairs Review*, 2008.

27. In the case of Lebanon the proliferation of refugees and displaced persons also has the consequence that it creates an imbalance in a confessional community which is constitutionally enshrined. The influx and ultimate imbalance of one particular religious group over another is a very real and serious consideration in terms of constitutional constraints that it represents and which we will discuss in more depth a little later in this Paper.
28. Lebanon has, in the main, responded responsibly to such potential tension creating situations. As an analogue, before we look at the Lebanese position we refer to the Special Program for Refugee Affected Areas (**SPRAA**) in Tanzania (1997-2003) which benefited host communities by promoting farming activities, road construction, and income-generating activities in surrounding areas.
29. A similar approach was developed in Lebanon by its Government in order to address the protracted circulation of Palestinian refugees. In response to the destruction caused to the Nahr-el Bared refugee camp in 2007 by high intensity fighting between the Lebanese Armed Forces and the Palestinian Fatah-al-Islam group, the Government of Lebanon developed a comprehensive new approach to address the protracted situation of Palestinian refugees in the Nahr-el Bared camp, which sought to turn the crisis into an opportunity. This approach aimed to link relief, recovery, and reconstruction activities through local development in the Nahr-el Bared Camp, as well as the adjacent and surrounding areas: see El-Amaout, 2010.
30. In essence, such comparison in terms of treatment and the ready realisation of solutions from conflict posed by the presence of displaced persons is of itself a sobering realisation that host nations, despite being effectively the recipient of the casualties of armed conflict are nevertheless able to resolve and diffuse further potential conflict and insurrection from within their own borders. In that regard, Lebanon has been a classic example of a host nation that has tolerably and effectively accommodated displaced persons and of particular emphasis as recently from the Syrian conflict and prior thereto Iraq and Palestine, with admirable dignity and humanitarian attention. Sadly, Lebanon's generosity and benevolence has gone unnoticed and unrewarded.

31. It is now imperative that we look to a national portrait of Lebanon and the impact that the influx of displaced persons has had and is having on this nation State, which is so geographically small in terms of its defined land parameters, and itself a casualty of a long running civil war, where it sustained and endured hardship and yet phoenix-like has re-emerged to be effectively the good Samaritan within the region – but for how much longer?

DISPLACED PERSONS' IMPACT ON THE LEBANESE ECONOMY

32. In this particular aspect of our Paper we acknowledge and will quote liberally from First Vice-Governor Raed H. Charafeddine of the Banque du Liban.
33. In what is recommended reading on this matter, the Vice-Governor in May 2016, in a very detailed and poignantly persuasive article titled “**The impact of the Syrian displacement crisis on the Lebanese economy**”, delivered that lecture to the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies at the Maison de la Paix on 10 May 2016 in Geneva, Switzerland. The Paper is commended to the UN Summit as both recommended reading and a very frank and full account of the societal and economic factors that are prevalent within Lebanon and need to be addressed by the United Nations in terms of ensuring that there is reciprocity in the treatment of both refugees and displaced persons with respect to the impact they have on host nations.
34. In his Paper, Charafeddine (hereafter **RHC**) referred to the economic sectors which were undermined and in particular trade and tourism, as a result of the Syrian conflict and the influx of displaced people from Syria. The economic activity declined and production waned, resulting in a downturn of Government revenue and a spike in the public deficit.
35. At p.3 of the RHC Paper, the learned author made the following comparison, which speaks for itself:

“Compared to the vast capacities of the EU and the limited means of Lebanon, it appears that “Europe with a population of 512 million – 128 times greater than the Lebanese population – and an area of 4.4 million square kilometres –i.e. 440 times larger than the area of Lebanon – had a massive debate about hosting 120,000 refugees – that is 12 to 15 times fewer than the number of refugees in Lebanon.”

See also the Statement by UN Resident and Humanitarian Co-ordinator in Lebanon, Ross Mountain:

<http://www.16.undp.org/content/Lebanon/en/home/presscenter/articles/2014/03/21lebanon-cannotbearbrunt-of-Syrian-refugees-crisis-alone-un-relief-officialconcerns.html>

36. Interestingly, this compares recently with the article written in the Daily Mail published 29 August 2016 where Angela Merkel was quoted as having “underestimated” the effect of her open door policy as record numbers of migrants entered Germany and her Deputy Sigmar Gabriel was quoted as criticising Angela Merkel’s open door refugee policy. He said she “underestimated the challenge of integrating the migrants” and he added that it was “inconceivable Germany could take another million migrants”.
37. Of particular concern was the statement by the Vice Chancellor that: “The Union has underestimated the challenges [of integrating refugees], and I, we, have always said that it is inconceivable to take one million people into Germany every year”. He further added: “There is an upper limit to a country’s integration ability”. He then went on to highlight how Germany had 300,000 new schoolchildren and could not integrate that many pupils every year because of a shortage of teachers and buildings. He also criticised Merkel’s catch phrase “Wir schaffen das”, meaning “We can do this”, which she adopted during the migrant crisis last summer and has repeatedly used since. The Vice Chancellor indicated that Germany needed to send several hundred thousand refugees back in the next three years, rather than bringing in their families.
38. The obvious proposition extrapolated from such a comparison is that if one of the most highly industrialised and efficient nations within the world has found that taking in refugees and/or displaced persons to the extent that the Chancellor so generously

and benevolently undertook has created such manifest problems in terms of the impact on infrastructure and society, what chance then has Lebanon got, bearing in mind its role and its position in comparison to Germany? The answer is patently obvious that there needs to be and this Summit must address the critical and constant concern that host nations and the impact that the displaced persons have upon them must be properly assessed and efforts taken to ensure that the impact is not irreversible and catastrophic. This is precisely what Lebanon is experiencing as she is effectively at the cross-roads, in terms of what the impact of the displaced persons and/or refugees has had and continues to have upon both her society and her economy.

39. In RHC's Paper, it is worth highlighting in a summary format what he has referred to as the impact of the Syrian conflict on Lebanon, which we will attempt to do in a summary fashion as follows:

- “The 2012-2014 World Bank Study on the impact of the Syrian conflict on the Lebanese economy remains in its figures and estimates a major bench mark for researchers and officials”: p.4.
- RHC referred to the World Bank's published report on the overall impact of the Syrian conflict, including the implications of the Syrian displacement crisis on Lebanon which was summarised as follows:

“(1) Overall impact on the economy – disrupting trade and impacting both consumer and business confidence, thus reducing Lebanon's GDP growth by an annual 2.9%

(2) Impact on public finance –

- (a) Cumulative loss in government revenues in 2012-2014, estimated at USD\$1.5 billion, as a result of the slowdown in economic activity;
- (b) Sudden sharp rise in demand for public services, generating an increase in public expenditure by USD\$1.1 billion;

- (c) Decline in revenues and increase in expenditure, driving up the deficit in Lebanon's public finance to USD\$2.6 million in 2012-2014;
- (d) An additional USD\$2.5 billion needed to restore stability.

(3) Impact on human and social development

(a) Poverty

- The impact of the massive waves of displaced persons pushed 170,000 more Lebanese nationals into the maws of poverty by 2014, with the descent of the current one million poor into further destitution;
- Restoring social services to their pre-crisis level, while maintaining quality and accessibility, up to late 2014, require the investment of USD\$177 million.

(b) Job Markets

- Intense competition for jobs by new entrants raised unemployment and informal business activities by 10 percentage points, with 220,000-324,000 Lebanese nationals joining the ranks of the unemployed by 2014;
- Addressing the sudden spike in the number of job-seekers requires resources ranging between USD\$166 million and USD\$242 million.

(c) Health

- The urgent health needs of displaced persons drove up the cost of the Lebanese health system, decreased the supply of medications and made health care more inaccessible to Lebanese nationals (displaced Syrians who accounted for 40% of total primary health care visits), which may also result in the overall rise in disease;
- The impact of the health care system on public finance was estimated at USD\$48 million to USD\$69 million in 2014, based on the influx of displaced persons, while restoring health services to pre-crisis levels required between USD\$216 million and USD\$306 million in 2014.

(d) Education

Some 90,000 Syrian children were enrolled in schools for the academic year 2013-2014, a figure that will soar to 140,000-170,000 children in the following academic year. As a result, the Lebanese public education system required between USD\$348 million and USD\$434 million in additional funds in 2014;

(4) Impact on infrastructure

(a) Water and sanitation

The water and sanitation network in Lebanon experienced a sudden and massive rise of 7% in overall demand, accompanied by a rise in the cost of public finance, in 2012-2014, by approximately USD\$18 million requiring USD\$340 million – USD\$375 million during the same period to sustain service delivery and quality.

(b) Solid waste

The sudden increase in the population more than doubled the generated solid waste, thus contributing to the pollution of water resources and the spread of disease, which required the investment of USD\$139 million – USD\$206 million for waste management in 2012-2014.

(c) Electricity

The sudden and considerable rise in demand on the electricity grid drove up costs by USD\$314 million – USD\$393 million in 2014 with investment ranging between USD\$310 million and USD\$440 million to boost electricity generation capacity and improve the electricity network by late 2014.

(d) Transportation

Truck transit through Syria saw a decline in business by 65% due to the shrinking economic activity. Traffic circulation, however, increased by 15-50% across Lebanon due to the new arrivals, with USD\$246 million – USD\$525 million needed in 2012-2014 to cover the costs of additional maintenance of roads and for expanding the scope of public transportation and disbursing compensation to truck operators.”

40. The above quote, as appears in RHC's Paper, was a quote from the World Bank published report which he set out in his Paper and which can be found as: "Lebanon economic and social impact assessment of the Syrian conflict, document of the World Bank, report No 81098LD, September 20, 2013: http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2013/09/24/000333037_20130924111238/Rendered/PDF/810980LB00box.379831800P147500PUBLIC0.pdf It is obviously commended as recommended reading.
41. The World Bank Report did not focus on the positive economic aspects of the Syrian displacement which RHC very honourably and fairly highlighted at pp.6-8 of his Paper which can be summarised in point format as follows:
- (1) Reducing labour, wages and cost of production.
 - (2) Spending on housing rents.
 - (3) Increase in consumer spending.
 - (4) Influx of funds from donor countries.
 - (5) Starting new businesses.
42. These matters he refers to as positives but nevertheless they do not, whilst he fairly concedes that they are benefits, they are hardly matters that in any way assuage the concern or for that matter reduce the impact that the displacement had and continues to have on the Lebanese economy and its society.
43. A further feature of the Paper by RHC is the Lebanese official position with respect to the crisis and it is self-explanatory and somewhat profound to quote from the Paper at pp.9-10, excerpts which inevitably have a chilling effect, in terms of what has occurred and is being sustained by Lebanon as a result of the influx of displaced people. The excerpts are as follows:

“.. in fact, the World Bank has estimated that Lebanon has incurred losses of USD\$13.1 billion since 2012 out of which USD\$5.6 billion in 2015 alone (over 11% of GDP).

... in a message during the EU, Jordan and Lebanon Foreign Ministers' UN meeting on the Syria conflict, Lebanese Minister of Foreign Affairs Jibril Bassil said: “Lebanon is facing two dangers: displacement and terrorism”. He observed that this crisis is unprecedented in numbers in human history, especially with “the presence of 200 displaced Syrians per square kilometre across the expanse of Lebanon. Displaced Syrians and Palestinian refugees in Lebanon account for 45% of the country's population. We are fighting terrorism on our borders and within our territory. There are also 210,000 Syrian students in our schools, against 225,000 Lebanese students, in addition to 70,000 Syrian children born in Lebanon.”

44. This is a telling scenario and one which regrettably does not feature within the Secretary General's Paper published in preparation and readiness for this Summit. It does not feature in any of the 3 Pillars that he proposes as solutions for the way forward. One can only wonder why?
45. As a committed and concerned NGO we, as the WLCU, are both ready, willing and able to augment the aspirations of Lebanon throughout the Diaspora to highlight and have readily recognised the need for the international community to not only be sensitive to but realistic in terms of the appraisal of the dire straits that Lebanon is currently labouring under.
46. There can be no doubt that since the late 1970s the international community has been well aware of the severe impact that the large scale refugee populations can have on the social, economic and political life of host developing countries. A recent example of this was the Rwanda Emergency, which highlighted this graphically and very tragically.
47. There is also no doubt that the highest concentrations of refugee populations are some of the poorer countries in the world. These are the least developed countries and the presence of refugees compounds the already prevailing economic, environmental, social and, at times, political difficulties in these countries. Often such countries are

confronted by a combination of all four of these factors. Nearly always, the impact is substantial and in the case of Lebanon, even more graphically so.

48. It can be clearly seen from the Paper written by RHC that the presence of refugee (and for the avoidance of doubt, such concept is to include displaced persons and internally displaced persons, if necessary) compounds the already prevailing economic, environmental, social and, at times, political difficulties in countries such as Lebanon. Often such countries are confronted by a combination of all four of these factors and their impact is substantial, as can be clearly seen in the case of Lebanon.
49. Aggravation, in terms of problematic presentation, occurs where refugees are a substantial proportion of the local, if not national population; again as occurred in Lebanon and more to the point in terms of historical examples, as occurred in Nepal, the District of Jhapa, where 90,000 refugees represented over 30% of the local population; in Ngara in the United Republic of Tanzania, where the refugee influx meant that the local population was outnumbered by a ratio of approximately 4:1, i.e. there were some 700,000 refugees amongst a local population of 186,000. In similar terms Malawi, a refugee influx which began in 1986 had, by 1993 risen to 1 million. Mozambican refugees in the country which were equated with some 10% of the national population.
50. What is fast becoming apparent within Lebanon is that the presence of refugees, and the demands on the already severely strained economy, services and infrastructure, add to the extreme hardship affecting the local population. In many instances refugees have become an added impediment to or risk jeopardising the development efforts of the host country. Sadly, negative aspects may be felt long after a refugee problem is resolved.
51. It can, we think, be effectively asserted that from the moment of arrival, refugees compete with local citizens for scarce resources such as land, water, housing, food and medical services. In that regard, the World Bank Report for Lebanon highlighted each of those particular areas where the resource had been effectively strained, if not

compromised by the need for so many to have resort to or access the availability of that particular service.

52. Yet again, we see over time their presence leads to more substantial demands on natural resources, education and health facilities, energy, transportation, social services and employment. The consequence is inflationary pressure on prices and a depression on wages often results. They can significantly alter the flow of goods and services within the society as a whole and their presence may have implications for the host country's balance of payment undermining structural adjustment initiatives. Market disturbances are regularly seen with rental accommodation for office and residential purposes in response to a refugee situation. Increased construction activity results, but this is usually accompanied by increases in rent, benefiting those who are property owners, but adversely affecting the poor and those on fixed incomes, such as government officers. Purchases of large quantities of building material may make them scarce or unobtainable for local people, also generating inflationary effects. Likewise, increased demand for food and other commodities can lead to price rises in the market which will stimulate local economic activity, although, again, not benefiting the poorest.
53. One can well understand that host government would understandably be reluctant to pay, as a price for giving asylum, the cost of additional infrastructure that may be needed to accommodate refugees where they are, in terms of their own public works development program under strain, vis a vis, the local populace.
54. Lebanon must be seen as a government in charge of a low income country; despite the fact that there are middle to high income earners, the overwhelming majority of the population are in the low income threshold and as such, no government is prepared to contract loans or re-allocate its previous development funds to programs designed for or required because of large numbers of refugees on their land. This is also to be seen in the context that vast numbers of Lebanon's graduates are fleeing the country in droves because of no opportunity for employment, thereby resulting in an intellectual capital deficit.

55. No doubt, and it will be readily discernible from the World Bank Report for Lebanon, mass movements of refugees are an example of a situation where the impact on the ecology is not fully under control, because the emergency character of the movement normally does not allow for early and proper planning of the new habitat.
56. The addition of a sizeable group of refugees to an existing population creates a sudden massive demand for scarce natural resources such as land, fuel, water, food and shelter materials, with long-term implications on the sustainable regeneration. Other long-term problems relate to erosion, decreased soil fertility and landslides. Problems related to wood consumption are invariably serious.
57. Examples of the devastating impact of large refugee populations on the eco-systems and on the infra-structure over host countries can be found in the experience of the Islamic Republics of Iran and Pakistan in hosting Afghan refugees. For instance, in Pakistan, over two million refugees contributed to the accelerated wear and tear of roads and canals, and a significant increase in the consumption of fuel and fodder resources.
58. A further consequence is the social impact where refugees, if they are from the same cultural and linguistic group as the local population, will often take comfort in identification with and sympathy for their situation. This, in the main has occurred in Lebanon. Mercifully, different ethnicity, which can be a basis for problems, does not arise in Lebanon, there being no traditional animosities that exist despite the fact that there has been deep seated resentment of the Assad regime and the unlawful occupation of Lebanon by Syrian troops until they left in 2005. Even to that end the tolerance of the Lebanese populace and the Government to allow and welcome the influx of Syrian refugees yet again highlights and augments Lebanon's reputation as a beacon on the headland when it comes to racial, ethnic and religious tolerance, so uncommon with the Middle East.
59. There is no doubt that in Lebanon, on account of the vulnerable female and juvenile population, there has been excessive exploitation with prostitution for both female and children rampant throughout the community and for that matter, sexual slavery is said

to be rife. While the Government can do its best to control and monitor and prosecute such offenders as may be necessary, nevertheless the problem is, to the extent that there is a need and people are prepared to engage in such activity, it prevents, if not inhibits, effective detection and prosecution. In addition, the crime rates for theft, murder and crimes of violence are also on the rise and the justice system is literally hampered, if not strained by the workload created by the proliferation of crime amongst the displaced person populace.

LEBANON'S RESPONSE

60. What then should Lebanon's response be? This must be linked to the international community's initiative. The response of the international community to the impact of large refugee populations on host countries has been uneven, characterised by different conceptual underpinnings and motivations. Within the conceptual framework which UNHCR sought to organise as a response, there was a facet of broader thinking on the relationship of refugee aid and development systems and their relationship, in turn, to durable solutions to refugee situations. As developments took place over time in relation to each of these three components, so did the emphasis on re-addressing the impact of refugees on host countries also change.
61. Starting in the 1980s, refugee aid and development strategies stressed the need for relief to be development-oriented from the outset.
62. On and from 1984, the terminology "Refugee Aid and Development Projects" began to be commonly used. These projects aimed, in part, at addressing some of the damage generated by the refugee pressure on host areas and were launched in China, Pakistan, Iran, Sudan, Malawi, Ethiopia, Tanzania, Zaire, Uganda, Mexico and Nepal.
63. Lebanon equally has formulated a crisis response plan which is highlighted at pp.10-12 of RHC's Report and can be summarised as follows:
 - (1) Prioritising the provision of humanitarian support and protection of the most vulnerable displaced persons and poorest Lebanese nationals.

- (2) Prioritising the strengthening of capacities of national or local public service systems, i.e. education, health and water.
 - (3) Prioritising the promotion of economic, social, environmental and institutional stability in Lebanon. The need to have a President elected as an indictment on the international community to assist and hasten the resolution of this impasse.
64. Lebanon, in terms of financing its crisis plan, sought from the UN and the World Bank further assistance of USD\$1.85 billion. A five year program for educational, economic opportunities and jobs was also proposed, requiring USD\$11.26 billion in financial support from donor countries and a Crisis Response Plan proposed the allocation of USD\$724 million of requested funding for stability of programs. The total value of the requested grants was, according to RHC USD\$4.96 billion, accompanied by a request for soft loans of USD\$6.3 billion.
65. What became of this? Lebanon had high hopes for the ambitious plan. However, as RHC has said, the donor countries contributed funding at a much lower level. In response to this, RHC stated in his report that:
- “All officials are aware that Lebanon’s institutions and organisations are unprepared to resolve on their own the problems of hundreds of thousands of affected families, provide them with shelter, food, medical services and education without the reasonable assistance of the international community, institutions and organisations.” (p.12)
66. This is hardly a response that is not in keeping with a nation that has, through its administration, been tolerable to the point where the patience of Job himself would have been tested.
67. The heavy price that host countries have to pay in providing asylum to refugees is now widely recognised. The rhetoric of international solidarity, however, is not always matched by support in addressing the negative impact that large scale refugee movements have on these countries. The failure to provide Lebanon with the finance

requested is a perfect example of the reluctance of the international community and its financial institutions to respond to proper and sober requests by host countries, where they are attempting to accommodate massive populations in severely constrained conditions and especially in Lebanon's case, where it has refused to allow the establishment of camps to enable the people to live within the community and not to be institutionalised. In this regard, Lebanon's example is both admirable, compared to countries such as Australia, where they will not even allow refugee applications to be monitored and processed on shore and require people to be incarcerated, especially children, in offshore detention centres that are notorious as barbarous and attendant with abject cruelty and insensitivity to the human condition crushing the spirit of all who are detained and incarcerated while awaiting asylum processing.

68. In that regard, Lebanon must be seen and regarded as both a benevolent and beneficent host nation; even though it is not a signatory to the UN Convention on Refugees, it has behaved with absolute resolve to ensure that the dignity of the human spirit is not shackled or for that matter emasculated, thereby according the human condition the dignity it justly deserves.
69. Obviously, the desired approach is to ideally, if it can be, prevent refugee situations from arising in the first place. However, when these do occur and asylum has been generously extended by a host country, it is the responsibility of the international community to mitigate, to the extent possible, the negative impact of such inflows and to address damage caused as a consequence. This is what we are seeking for Lebanon and we are bemoaning the failure to have implemented, in a discernible Agenda Paper, initiatives that would meet such contingencies.
70. Such action must recognise that the impact and legacy of hosting large numbers of refugees sets new and unforeseen challenges that have to be met largely by developmental, not emergency assistance, yet rarely fit within development aid cycles.

71. For this reason, as well as to safeguard the institution of asylum, the support to host countries must be additional. Such a response must be a tangible expression of solidarity and burden-sharing aimed at alleviating the burden borne by States that have received large numbers of refugees, in particular developing countries with limited resources.
72. RHC, in his paper looks to the proposed Lebanese and international solutions at pp.17-20, which he highlights and which we summarise as follows:
- (a) Repatriation of the displaced to safe areas in their home country and in Lebanon's case, Syria.
 - (b) Distributing displaced persons across neighbouring countries in Europe.
 - (c) The establishment of an international Trust Fund to support Lebanon.
 - (d) Channelling Lebanese investments to create free production border zones employing Syrian labour under Lebanese management.
 - (e) Creating industrial development zones with international funding.
 - (f) Soft loans from the World Bank.
 - (g) Creating a dedicated relief authority.
 - (h) Capitalising on strengths of both the Lebanese and Syrian economies.
73. Before concluding this particular aspect of our Paper, it is appropriate to quote from RHC's concluding remarks, which are as follows:

“... Despite the shortcomings of donor countries who delivered a mere fraction of the promised assistance, some European countries were finally asked to help, after experiencing the anguish of having displaced

persons wash up in droves on their shores, their waters becoming mass graves for migrants, and terrorism striking at the heart of their cities.

But until the hoped for [sic] international response to the proposed Lebanese solution is achieved, the Lebanese State cannot tolerate the escalation of the social and humanitarian tragedy in its security, political and economic risks. Lebanon must properly manage the displacement crisis with extreme care by developing its institutions, procedures and infrastructure and implementing development projects to deal with the burden and implications of the crisis. Indeed, Lebanese Ministries have counted the Syrian displacement crisis each within their jurisdiction, capabilities and missions. The Ministry of Defence, through the Lebanese Armed Forces, proceeded to handle security tensions generated by the Syrian conflict.

... The Lebanese Government has earned the trust of the international community. It ensured political stability and security, resolved to support displaced Syrians and has assumed the responsibility of sheltering them in Lebanon.

... The optimal solution for which we hope is the safe return of displaced Syrians to their home country in the light of the political resolution of the Syrian conflict that ensures stability and security in Syria.” (pp.20-21)

74. These sobering and salutary sentiments responsibly given by a senior public official responsible for the economic management of Lebanon and its financial welfare are a testament to the nation that has single-handedly and in the most adverse of conditions striven to ensure and uphold the dignity of human beings in accordance with the Declaration of Human Rights as promulgated by the United Nations.
75. It now requires us to return to the Secretary General’s Report A/70/59, to address matters within that report, bearing in mind that it is to be relied upon in the course of the deliberations to be undertaken at the forthcoming Summit.
76. There is no doubt that the learned Secretary General has realised, in paragraph 3 of his report, that individual countries cannot solve issues on their own. National and collective responses must address the reasons people leave their homes, their need for safe passage and protection with respect to both the immediate and long term needs of those who cross into other countries.

77. The Secretary General is quite correct when he concludes, at paragraph 3, that: “In short, all members of the international community must do much better”.
78. The Report of the learned Secretary General deals extensively and comprehensively with migration issues and in particular refugees and displaced persons.
79. At paragraph 40 of the Report, the learned Secretary General notes:
- “... with grave concern that xenophobic and racist responses to refugees and migrants seem to be reaching new levels of stridency, frequency and public acceptance. ... given the overwhelming evidence that personal contact significantly reduces prejudice, more creative ways of fostering contacts between host communities on the one hand and refugees and migrants on the other are urgently needed.”
80. It is a very trite and sound observation. However, from the WLCU’s perspective, the learned Secretary General can look no further, or should look no further than Lebanon itself, to see how such a pragmatic and probative response, if not development, has already been occurring within Lebanon since the onset of the Syrian influx on and from May 2011.
81. What we would urge the United Nations to understand and more importantly to appreciate, is that despite the Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan referred to in paragraph 43 of the Report, there is within that Plan no sound initiative that would respond to the need for the urgent financial relief and assistance that Lebanon is asking for. In short, the need to have the UNHCR and the United Nations Development Program oversee and lead in the implementation of this Plan is laudable but nevertheless not fulfilling the very urgent and pressing need that Lebanon is calling for and seeking to have implemented to ensure that within its borders it can retrieve and restore the domestic economy to accommodate for the refugee influx. This is a matter that the United Nations must clearly address and it does not appear apparent from the Report how the Plan will attempt to do so.
82. Equally prescient as observations and initiatives are the matters referred to in paragraphs 46 and 47, which are measures to be put in place to ensure that countries

can avert and prevent genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This, of course is far too late in Syria and especially when we recently have seen the use of barrel and cluster bombs, chlorine gas and other chemical weapons which is completely and utterly against all manner of international law and amounts to a war crime and in respect of which no genuine initiative has been forthcoming as at this stage, to ensure that the prosecution of these offenders is both investigated and undertaken.

83. This of itself renders hollow, if not meaningless, paragraph 50 of the Report which states:

“All of these initiatives are signs that many actors in different contexts and places are searching for ways to increase international co-operation to respond to large movements of refugees and migrants. There is much to build on.”

84. We certainly do concur in the observation that there is a need, if not overdue, for construction, but construction that will see and effectively ensure that regimes such as those which have existed and proliferated in Syria for years and to which the world community has turned a blind eye, are effectively brought to justice, as is inevitable and is the just due of each and every Syrian citizen who has become a casualty of both the barbarity and the criminality of the perpetrators of those war crimes. In that regard Lebanon is a vicarious victim of that criminality.

85. There is of course much optimism that is generated, if not originating in the concluding paragraphs of the report. In one particular instance, at paragraph 84 the report states:

“Most refugees wish to return home. When conditions in the country of origin are conducive to return, a comprehensive refugee response will entail means for their return within an appropriate framework of physical, legal and material safety, in accordance with international standards and as required for their re-integration. Countries of origin must also create the conditions necessary for sustainable return by incorporating their integration needs into national development planning, as well as through amnesties, human rights guarantees and measures to enable to the restitution of property.”

86. While this is a very pious sentiment, and one that is brimming as we have said with optimism, where are the initiatives in the vain hope that the Syrian crisis will be imminently resolved? It is this failure to ensure and identify the remedies and the programs in support of those remedies that causes concern to be harboured by all interested NGOs and in particular the WLCU, bearing in mind its affiliation with the Lebanese Diaspora and Lebanon.
87. This in turn brings us to the 3 Pillars to be found at pp.23-27 of the Report. We do not seek to tax the patience of the reader by setting out verbatim the contents of each of those sections dealing with each of the Pillars, save that we will address each Pillar in turn and give a summation of what we contend are the matters of concern that should be resorted to by the UN and its officers when reviewing the initiatives to be undertaken. Accordingly, a consideration of the Pillars is as follows:

Pillar 1: Uphold safety and dignity in large movement of both refugees and migrants

88. In this particular solution as proposed, Member States are urged to place their collective resources behind efforts to prevent armed conflict and to ensure the early and durable resolution of armed conflicts, taking into consideration that permanent recommendations of three independent reviews in 2015 relating to peace and security as well as additional measures spelled out in the Secretary General's report for the World Humanitarian Summit (A/70/709).
89. This is incontrovertible in terms of the propositions that are encapsulated within it. However, it is of little comfort to Lebanon and other host nations in similar circumstances where there is a singular lack of effort to resolve the Syrian crisis, save that Russia is adamant to support and prop up the Syrian regime in order to ensure that its ally remains in power. This of itself is hardly meeting the Pillar 1 concerns.

Pillar 2: Global compact on responsibility – sharing for refugees

90. In the course of this Pillar as proposed, it seeks to recognise that countries of origin have clear responsibilities and obligations towards their nationals inherent in sovereignty and rooted in international human rights and humanitarian law, for which they remain accountable.
91. In a responsible reflex of reciprocity that has been accorded implicitly to nations such as Lebanon, there is also a paragraph acknowledging the extraordinarily generous contributions made by countries and communities hosting refugee populations and the need to provide greater support where needed to host communities which are the first to observe the impact of any major influx of refugees. Whilst this is a very fit and proper observation to make, Lebanon has never been the beneficiary of anything substantive that would seem to have been mooted, if not augured by the sentiments so expressed. In that regard, we urge the United Nations to proactively not only acknowledge Lebanon but more importantly, sit with her Government and undertake the constructive co-operation that is sorely overdue and much needed.

Pillar 3: Global compact for safe, regular and orderly migration

92. This particular Pillar is a little optimistic in terms of what it seeks to achieve but more importantly, when one looks to Syria and its abysmal track record to date, in terms of its administration and the government that has single-handedly wrought this severe and inexcusable human tragedy, the proffering of action in part by the Secretary General for the ensuring of:

“... [such] a process should include support for fostering the enhanced regional and global dialogue and deepening collaboration on migration by building on best practices, and collaboration and the regional commissions, regional consultative processes and multilateral forums, especially the Global Forum on Migration and Development”

is a little optimistic in the absence of identified initiatives able to be readily implemented.

93. This is, as we have indicated, a very worthwhile exercise, in terms of the sentiment expressed, but how can it be able to be implemented where Syria is unable to govern itself, let alone to assist in giving constructive, if not reliable advice on migratory trends?
94. Finally the strengthening of the relationship between the United Nations and the International Organisation for Migration through a “strength of a legal relationship” – whatever that may mean – is not to be scoffed at but rather requires far better particularity than has been given and one would hope that the authors who assisted in the preparation of the Secretary General’s Report will eventually condescend to particularity to assist in identifying how this relationship can be identified and brought about.
95. In summation, on the Report of the Secretary General, there is no doubt that the Report is of itself a momentous and timely document, replete with noble consideration for the dignity of the human spirit and to be applauded for upholding the humanitarian concerns that it so properly professes but what it does not do and what it fails to appreciate is that Lebanon can never be the beneficiary of such a statement where there is nothing that is actively mooted, in terms of assisting Lebanon and other host countries of a like nature. To that end, it is hoped that when the debate occurs and the matters are considered, these, if one may say, constructive criticisms are put before those responsible, they will be attended to with the concern requisite to the manner in which they have been ventilated.

PALESTINIAN REFUGEES IN LEBANON

96. This is also a matter that has not received any proper consideration in the Secretary General’s Report. It also concerns and highlights another facet of Lebanon’s magnanimity as a nation to the Palestinian people who have been displaced and continue to be displaced as Stateless individuals, which is both a travesty and an injustice that is intolerable.

97. The Palestinian refugee problem is uniquely complex, protracted and significant. One of its particular aspects is that most Palestinian refugees want to return to their home and/or lands but are unable to do so, not because of a fear persecution – commonly found in other refugee situations – but because they will not be allowed to enter their Occupied Palestinian Territory (**OPT**) or Israel by the Israeli Authorities.
98. The three durable solutions for refugees are resettlement in a third country, local integration in the country of asylum, and voluntary repatriation.
99. Voluntary repatriation – or return – is often referred to as the preferred solution for refugees. The right to return is also a right guaranteed under international law and, in the case of the Palestinians, has been affirmed by several UN bodies, including the General Assembly and the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination. It applies not just to those who were directly expelled and their immediate families, but also to those of their descendants who have maintained what the Human Rights Committee calls “close and enduring connections” with the area.
100. The Casablanca Protocol, which was the main instrument protecting the rights of Palestinian refugees, has been patchily implemented.
101. Unjustly, in our opinion, Lebanon has been criticised as perhaps the most visible example of where political and historical conditions have created extremely difficult conditions for Palestinian refugees.
102. What the international community has failed to realise and now, with the influx of Syrian refugees compounding the already critical position with respect to the Palestinian refugees, is that it would be utterly impractical, if not impossible, for the principle of international burden and responsibility sharing, which recognises that “the grant of asylum may place unduly heavy burdens on certain countries” so that the international community should play a greater role in encouraging and assisting host nations such as Lebanon to extend the highest possible level of enjoyment of human rights to its refugee population.

103. This is utterly impractical and not unrealistic to ensure that there would be, literally, taken into account the population of the Palestinian refugees and the population of the Syrian refugees and assimilation of those people within the Lebanese society, such that they would swell the numbers of the Lebanese census to an extent where they would effectively become a majority or certainly have enough numerical supremacy in dictating the outcome of the nation's destiny. It does not include other displaced peoples such as the Iraqis.
104. This is not in any way to demean or denigrate the Palestinian people or their plight but rather it highlights just how utterly inexorable and exasperating the Lebanese position has become in terms of the State administration and the problems it faces with two large refugee populations.
105. There is no doubt that realising the right to return home remains the most obvious way to address the situation of Palestinian refugees. To advocate that concerned States and international communities should make serious efforts to ensure that the right to return can be practicably and effectively exercised by Palestinian refugees is a gross understatement, it having been advocated and sought to be implemented for so many years that it now has become hackneyed, in terms of its litanic like repetition.
106. It also highlights and underpins the critical position that Lebanon is in and has been labouring under since the cessation of the Civil War and the administrative nightmare that ensued as glaringly revealed in the failure to elect a President.
107. Dwelling on this, if we may, Lebanon has absorbed the enormous Syrian influx but at a high cost to both refugees and the Lebanese population. Current humanitarian programs can no longer cope and new approaches are needed. This observation applies equally to the Palestinian problem and we hasten to add that we do not mean it in a derogatory sense, in terms of classifying it as a problem.
108. A very startling observation is that many thousands of refugees have not tried to register and it would not be an exaggeration to indicate that the percentage of Syrian refugees in Lebanon would exceed 20%, taking into account those who are registered

and those who are not registered. This possibly is a sober assessment and dare we say, under-exaggerated. The rumour of Syrian refugee and their number in the norther of Lebanon is said to exceed a million people, although this is unsubstantiated.

109. It is to be said and it must be noted, as we have opined on numerous occasions above, that the government of Lebanon has, in many respects, pursued an admirable policy. Borders have until 2014 remained open. Refugees have been allowed to settle where they like and they are allowed to work. Camps have been prohibited and refugees have settled within communities. Such an approach deserved the applause which was given by the international community. It requires and is the just due of unstinted praise that the Lebanese people have not reacted as xenophobes.
110. Nevertheless, as RHC has noted, such a policy comes at a cost. Refugees are concentrated in some of the poorest parts of the country. Sudden expansion of the labour pool has pushed down wages for the Lebanese and Syrians alike. Education and health services that were inadequate before are now further stretched. All available housing is full or over-full and the refugees are setting up unsanitary shanty settlements. There is a perception that international assistance is going only to refugees, which in turn creates tension between refugees and Lebanese communities although there has been no major outbreak or disturbance that would warrant public notoriety.
111. There are very few opportunities for employment and many refugees resort to desperate measures to cover their costs. As we have already noted, prostitution, early marriage, begging and working for exploitative wages, apart from sex slavery are means whereby incomes are earned.
112. There is no doubt that the World Food Program is implementing a large scale food voucher program and other organisations are providing household items and cash support. Nevertheless, it is inconceivable, in our opinion that an income generation program will help more than a tiny proportion of the refugees who are present with Lebanon.

113. While camps are forbidden and remain forbidden, their inevitability is something that cannot be ruled out. A compelling argument against camps is that they take away the refugee's opportunity to manage their own lives. Equally, Lebanon as a small country has little, if any vacant land to the extent that it would be available and able to be utilised to the degree that it would not represent a loss in arable land or development opportunity and as such is a further constraint on the management policy for refugees within Lebanon.
114. What is critical for the UN is to ensure that aid is shared across refugee and host populations. This is only fair, as needs within Lebanese communities are similar to those faced by refugees. If carefully targeted, it will also reduce local-intercommunal tension.
115. What is not present within the UN Report is the fact that Lebanon, as a host nation and whilst it may not be singled out for special comment or significance, is nevertheless inextricably caught up in Syrian affairs. The country is not only mopping up the mess caused by the war in Syria, but it is also moving rapidly into its own internal crisis. Unless we see decisive action by Lebanese politicians and international donors, it is hard to see this can be avoided. Equally, the population figures referred to by RHC speak for themselves and to add to this, the outbreaks of the proxy war intermittently waged in Tripoli and the political paralysis at the central level, it is easy to see why many Lebanese fear for their country.
116. The vacuum created by the failure to elect a president is a disgrace and a national disgrace at that. And the fact that it has been allowed to endure for so long is of itself a key integer in Lebanon's insecurity.
117. While we have advocated and applauded the generous and spontaneous spirit of the Lebanese people and its government, there is also a need, on account of the severity and urgency of the situation, where the Lebanese Ministers within the Cabinet must take tough decisions to reorganise priorities within their Ministries. The refugee crisis cuts across political blocs and politicians of all persuasions have to recognise this.

118. At the practical level, Ministries, UN Agencies and NGOs need to be more efficient and pragmatic. We, along with all of them, must work together towards an agreed (but flexible) set of objectives. They must be creative continually looking for ways to address problems as they emerge and change.
119. All of this requires an enormous need and injection of funds and the Government of Lebanon and the UN need to realistically assess and ensure the brokering of financial packages that will deliver the needs of the Lebanese Government and assuage the concerns of the United Nations, that the plight of the refugees will be accommodated.
120. The crisis in Lebanon cannot be solved with humanitarian assistance. It needs flexible and well-targeted aid to reduce the impact of the political crisis. The Government and Aid Agencies must respond to the ever-changing environment with carefully considered policy shifts that have been mooted above and are inevitably required to ensure that Lebanon bridges the impasse and resolves the conflict, potential but not necessarily completely at this stage, that the refugee crisis represents.

CONFESSONAL CONSTITUTIONALISM

121. Probably the most pressing, if not real concern that the influx of refugees warrants and more particularly if they remain and seek to exercise rights as citizens, albeit by the effluxion of time, is the fact that it will place intolerable constraints on the confessional constitutionalism that has propped up Lebanon since it became independent. This is matter that Lebanon cannot tolerate or allow to proliferate.
122. That Lebanon is in a stage of fragility is an understatement. To better understand State fragility it is necessary to see that it must be resolved without in any way allowing for attacks on the Constitutional compact that has governed Lebanon since its independence.

123. Securing State fragility, combined with improvements in policy and funding to displaced populations, is necessary to prevent the proliferation of further regional conflict and more importantly from intra-regional conflict.
124. State fragility, conflict and violence were central themes in the 2011 World Bank World Development Report on Lebanon. It showed that the connection between the prevention of intra-State conflict and broader international security was becoming ever more accepted.
125. What was less well understood were the dynamic interdependencies to be found between forced migration and State fragility.
126. Syria is an admirable testament to the fact that fragile and failed States produce the majority of the world's refugees, asylum seekers and IDPs. They are among the most at-risk people on the planet and are often subjected to intolerable living conditions, human rights abuses and chronic uncertainty regarding their future wellbeing.
127. In turn, displaced populations also have an effect on the host countries in which they are forced to reside – usually labouring countries – where they can exacerbate resource scarcity leading to tensions and conflict.
128. Lebanon has witnessed and experienced a sudden large influx of a displaced population which also has a negative effect on State stability.
129. Hosting the number of refugees, in the order of a million plus, appears to have had a significant effect on the chance of conflict erupting although mercifully at this stage nothing has eventuated. One can see the “knee jerk reaction” of Germany, when there was an outbreak of hooligan violence, completely unwarranted and unnecessary, which has now caused the Chancellor to regret the ready influx which she invited of refugees into Germany, as discussed above.
130. Looking to the matter in a reverse context, to see just exactly what one speaks of as a concept with respect to State fragility, take Syria as a prime example. By 2007,

approximately 1.2 million Iraqi refugees were registered. This resulted in massive increases in the prices of everything from basic food stuffs to house rents. Water and electricity consumption ballooned. Skyrocketing unemployment, crowded schools, overrun hospitals and degradation of basic social service programs were all symptoms of the influx of refugees. In turn, displeasure spread through both the host country and the refugee populations, leading to riots and tensions and outbreaks of violence. Pressure mounted on the Syrian Government to calm the various crises but, with few resources and mounting demands on basic services, not much could be done.

131. In retrospect, there is a strong case to be made that the discontent created by the situation contributed to the later explosion of violence in Syria in 2012.
132. Another mechanism through which State fragility may increase due to neighbouring conflict is through the mass proliferation of small arms and other weapons, possibly along with the spread of radical ideologies. One recent example of such a situation is the 2012 conflict in Mali, which was effectively precipitated by the intervention of NATO forces in Libya, but partially as a result of the provision of weapons to rebel fighters, including Tuareg people.
133. It is still too early to determine the long-term effects of this crisis on economic and social development in Mali. It cannot be estimated with particular accuracy but there would be, it is estimated, over 200,000 internally displaced persons in Mali and over 200,000 refugees in neighbouring countries. This does not account for unregistered persons, for which there are no accurate estimates. A deeper understanding of the fragile situation in Mali and the impact of conflict in neighbouring Libya might well provide policy-makers with practical options to prevent the subsequent rebellion and thus better protect the population of Northern Mali.
134. What is relevant in terms of the situation in Lebanon is that these are examples which are illustrative of the policy implications for both the host country and the international community of humanitarian donors and aid organisations.

135. For the host country, support must be given to incoming refugees, claims must be processed quickly and assistance should be provided in finding gainful employment and somewhere permanent to live.
136. What we are suggesting is that the broader message is that the more fragile the State is the more assistance the authorities need in order to be able to predict and respond to such events through both political and macro-economic reforms. In addition, global regional and lack of conflict early-warning and response systems must incorporate this knowledge into their framework of indicators.
137. Only through developing a more acute understanding of State fragility and its relationship to displacement can we better prevent and respond to crisis events such as those displacing millions of people around the world today.
138. The resolution adopted by the Human Rights Council on 1 July 2016, A/HRC/RES/32/11 is also a recent document that is timely as a promulgation prior to the Summit. In that regard we, as a matter of course, would urge that the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons be given the appropriate support as is requested by the Resolution.
139. Before concluding on the question of constitutional confessionalism, it is appropriate, in terms of political science terminology, the concept, i.e. confessionalism, which designates a system of government that proportionally allocates political power amongst a country's communities – whether religious or ethnic – according to their percentage of the population. It derives from another, more academic, term called consociationalism. That, in essence, has four elements:
- (1) Proportional allocation of political posts among communities according to their numerical representation in the population.
 - (2) A grand coalition between communities' leaders on common policies that serve all.

- (3) Communal autonomy whereby each community is free to determine its own affairs, such as personal status laws.
 - (4) Mutual veto power, so that any decisions deemed detrimental by any community can be voted down.
140. While it is not the primary purpose of this Paper to discuss confessionalism as a political phenomenon, what is critical is that confessionalism in Lebanon, which is constitutionally observed and has been practised for many, many decades is now being constrained, if not compromised by the presence of a population that effectively tests the concept constitutionally.
141. In that regard, this adds a further impediment to Lebanon's ability to govern itself by reason of the influx of the refugees and displaced persons. This has not been addressed in the United Nations Report by the Secretary General and, with respect, whilst not requisite as to a specific treatment of Lebanon as such, nevertheless as a manifestation in terms of sovereignty and governance, should have been alluded to as it represents a real and discernible threat to the sovereignty of the nation.
142. Concomitant with the concept of confessional constitutionalism is the issue of being *Stateless*. Stateless people are individuals who are not considered nationals by any State. Article 16 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights affirms that "everyone has a right to a nationality". Inevitably there are at least in the order of 6.6 million people worldwide, certainly at the conclusion of 2009, who were made to be Stateless. An accurate global count of Stateless people as at today's date could be as high as 12 million.
143. What is of concern is that the situation in Lebanon will lead to a possibility that there could be an exacerbation of the number of Stateless people who are already within Lebanon, in terms of the Palestinian populace. This is a matter that Lebanon must avoid.

144. Accordingly, we have, we hope, set out what are the integers of concern and parameters that need to be addressed with respect to the Summit and the consideration of refugees, specifically with respect to Lebanon.
145. It remains to be said that there is a need for positive and affirmative action with respect to Lebanon's right to be restored to govern and to have its sovereignty untrammelled and, for that matter, devoid of any limitations that are not rightfully imposed or for that matter unjustly incurred.
146. We commend the Paper to the Summit for such consideration as it may justly give and we welcome any criticism, bearing in mind that we, in turn, have been true to the dictates of the Charter of the United Nations in seeking to uphold the dignity of all citizens throughout the world, in the preservation of the ideals of the United Nations and its observance.\
147. In concluding, specific mention should be made to the members of the WLCU Delegation to the United Nations, who include Mr Elias Kassab, World President, Mr Wissam Azzi, World Secretary General, Mr Elie Gideon, Assistant World Secretary General, Mr Anise Garabet, Chairman of the UN Committee of the WLCU and Mr Roger Hani, Member of the UN WLCU Committee, together with Mr Nouhad Mahmoud, Committee Member of the UN Committee of the WLCU

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